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The psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm is a dominant research tool in the
literature on dual-task performance. In this paradigm a first and second component
task (i.e., Task 1 and Task 2) are presented with variable stimulus onset asynchronies
(SOAs) and priority to perform Task 1. The main indicator of dual-task impairment in
PRP situations is an increasing Task 2-RT with decreasing SOAs. This impairment is
typically explained with some task components being processed strictly sequentially in
the context of the prominent central bottleneck theory. This assumption could implicitly
suggest that processes of Task 1 are unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing,
i.e., decreasing SOAs do not increase reaction times (RTs) and error rates of the
first task. The aim of the present review is to assess whether PRP dual-task studies
included both RT and error data presentations and statistical analyses and whether
studies including both data types (i.e., RTs and error rates) show data consistent with
this assumption (i.e., decreasing SOAs and unaffected RTs and/or error rates in Task
1). This review demonstrates that, in contrast to RT presentations and analyses, error
data is underrepresented in a substantial number of studies. Furthermore, a substantial
number of studies with RT and error data showed a statistically significant impairment
of Task 1 performance with decreasing SOA. Thus, these studies produced data that
is not primarily consistent with the strong assumption that processes of Task 1 are
unaffected by Task 2 and bottleneck processing in the context of PRP dual-task
situations; this calls for a more careful report and analysis of Task 1 performance in
PRP studies and for a more careful consideration of theories proposing additions to
the bottleneck assumption, which are sufficiently general to explain Task 1 and Task 2
effects.
Keywords: PRP, dual tasks, capacity limitation, central bottleneck theory, reaction times, error data
Introduction
When people execute two simultaneous or systematically delayed distinct tasks under dual-task
conditions, performance in these tasks is often impaired (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Wickens, 1980;
Pashler, 2000, and many more). In the context of well-controllable behavioral dual-task situations,
these impairments are demonstrated by an increase in reaction times (RTs) and/or error rates under
dual-task in contrast to single-task conditions (the isolated task execution), referred to as “dual-task
costs.”
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One of the most prominent dual-task situations is of the psy-
chological refractory period (PRP) type (Telford, 1931; Vince,
1949; Welford, 1952; Pashler, 1984, 1994; Pashler and Johnston,
1989, 1998; Osman and Moore, 1993; Schubert, 1999; Schubert
et al., 2008). In this dual-task situation, two component tasks are
presented in close succession with various time intervals between
the onsets of a first and second task stimulus (i.e., variable stim-
ulus onset asynchronies, SOAs) and participants are given fixed-
priority instructions on the execution of the first task (Task 1). As
illustrated in Figure 1A, the performance of the second task (Task
2) typically decreases (e.g., RTs increase) with decreasing SOA
and increasing task overlap. This performance decrease indicates
dual-task costs in the context of PRP dual tasks (i.e., the PRP
effect).
To explain the PRP effect, the prominent central bottleneck
theory suggests that the mental operation associated with the
selection of which response to execute can never be made for two
tasks simultaneously. Instead, this model assumes that response
selection requires a single mechanism to be dedicated to it for
some period of time. Thus, there is a strict sequential response
selection in two tasks of a dual-task situation due to a structural
and unavoidable processing bottleneck. In this strict interpre-
tation of the central bottleneck model, the sequential process-
ing at the central bottleneck leads to processing impairments
(i.e., processing delays or errors) in the second component tasks
of a PRP situation. This processing impairment increases with
decreasing SOA (Pashler, 1994), leading to the PRP effect in
Task 2.
Accordingly, the literature on PRP/central bottleneck theory
typically introduces and entails no effect of SOA on Task 1
performance (Figure 1A; e.g., Pashler, 1984, 1994; Allen et al.,
1998; Ruthruff and Pashler, 2001; Kunde et al., 2007, and many
more). This lacking effect is a consequence of the assumption of
a strict sequential processing of response selections, i.e., (1) an
engagement of a central processing mechanism of 100 and 0%
to Task 1 and Task 2, respectively, before (2) an engagement of
this mechanism of 0 and 100% to Task 1 and Task 2, respectively.
Task 1 and Task 2 performance analyses should thus be treated in
the context of PRP situations and the central bottleneck theory
in order to test these assumptions. Furthermore, these analyses
should focus on all available data types. In the context of most
behavioral experiments, these analyses combine analyses on RTs
as well as error rate data.1
The dual-task literature, however, seems to treat (1) Task 1
performance and (2) error rates with less emphasis and caution.
One of the few examples that systematically relates dual-task per-
formance in form of error rates to RTs occurs in a series of studies
combining ideomotor compatibility tasks (i.e., component tasks
1Here, erroneous dual-task performance is defined as giving an incorrect
response or omitting a response in a particular component task and with
separate error rate analyses on Task 1 and Task 2. This perspective does not
consider studies in which any error that occurred during dual-task perfor-
mance (irrespective of the component task)meant that the dual task as a whole
was not performed correctly and thus error analysis was conducted for both
tasks in combination (e.g., Logan and Schulkind, 2000; Strobach et al., 2013;
Zwosta et al., 2013). We take this perspective, because the combined error
analysis does not allow elaborated and independent conclusions for Task 1 and
Task 2 performance.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of performance patterns in the context of dual
tasks of the Psychological Refractory Period type (note, that an
increase at the y axis represents performance impairment and an
increase at the x axis represents an increase in stimulus onset
asynchrony, SOA). Panel (A): Task 1 and Task 2 performance according to
the central bottleneck model. Panel (B): Task 1 and Task 2 performance
according to less strict sequential interpretations of bottleneck models and
impaired performance with decreasing SOA in both tasks.
in which stimulus information shares response information; e.g.,
if an auditory stimulus is “A” or “B,” say “A” and “B,” respectively)
in PRP situations (Lien et al., 2002; Greenwald, 2003). Dual-task
performance showed an effect of SOA on error rates regardless of
the type of instruction (Shin et al., 2007). These rates increased
from long to short SOAs under conditions of a speed-instruction
(i.e., “Perform as fast as possible”) as well as under a speed-and-
accuracy instruction (i.e., “Perform as fast and as accurately as
possible”) in both Task 1 and Task 2. The authors interpreted
these findings (in combination with RT data) as evidence for
bottleneck processing when combining ideomotor compatible
tasks. Alongside this example, there are only very few approaches
in PRP literature and literature with strict interpretations of the
central bottleneck theory that systematically apply and interpret
error data with a focus on Task 1 performance for modeling dual-
task processing. This is surprising considering that alternative
theoretical approaches within the context of the central bottleneck
theory (see Discussion) and outside this context (e.g., resource
theories, Kantowitz, 1978; Logan and Gordon, 2001; Navon and
Miller, 2002; Wickens, 2002; Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003) partic-
ularly provide systematic interpretations of Task 1’s error rates
as well as RTs. The consideration of Task 1’s data is essential to
produce a comprehensive picture of dual-task processing in the
context of these theories.
As a consequence of the impression of treating Task 1 perfor-
mance with less emphasis and caution, the aim of the present
study is to systematically review PRP literature with a focus on
(1) the report policy of Task 1 performance data as well as (2) the
actual performance in this task. The first aim generally specifies
the policy to report error data compared to RT data of Task 1.
Importantly, we specify this policy with a focus on presenting
RT and error data (e.g., in form of figures and/or tables), as
well as reporting statistics on both performance measures (e.g.,
in form of analysis of variance). While the central bottleneck
theory makes explicit assumptions on RTs, error rates are often
underrepresented in the context of this theory. Therefore, we
speculate that, due to this underrepresentation, the number of
PRP studies including reported error data (i.e., in form of data
presentations and statistical analyses) is lower than the number
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including RT data (despite a general request of no selective data
report in empirical studies, Boot et al., 2011).
We review whether Task 1 performance is independent of SOA
using the perspective of the second aim: that is, RTs and error rates
are constant across SOAs. On the other hand, the following data
patterns in Task 1 are not conceivable in the context of this theory:
(1) RTs are constant and error rates increase with decreasing SOA,
(2) error rates are constant and RTs increase with decreasing SOA,
(3) error rates and RTs increase with decreasing SOA (Figure 1B).
These latter data patterns are consistent with the assumption that
bottleneck processing is potentially less sequential than theorized
in a strict interpretation of the central bottleneck theory, but
they call for additions to this assumption (as indicated in the
Discussion).
We aim to investigate the proportion of PRP studies that are
consistent with one of these data patterns in the present review.
In detail, we analyzed the number of PRP experiments showing a
statistically significant main effect of SOA (typically in ANOVAs)
on Task 1’s RTs and/or error rates, in combination with data
patterns demonstrating impaired performance with decreasing
SOA (i.e., increased RTs and/or error rates with shorter SOA).2
PRP dual-task situations are rigorous tests of these patterns in
Task 1, since participants are explicitly instructed to prioritize
this task. This priority on Task 1 should make this task less
vulnerable for performance modulations due to the timing (i.e.,
SOA) of the following Task 2 and should reduce the likelihood
of impaired Task 1 performance with decreasing SOAs. Note
that we exclusively review SOA main effects on RTs and/or error
rates because we focus on robust effects. This focus on robust
effects parallels the robust emergence of PRP effects in Task 2
and their clear demonstration via SOAmain effects. Furthermore,
our focus on SOA main effects allows us to combine analyses
across different studies in which SOA modulation is often com-
bined with one or a set of alternative factors (e.g., modulations of
stimulus characteristics, stimulus-response relations, etc.). Gen-
erally, this type of review should help advance the dual-task
literature by specifying the dual-task processing architecture of
PRP dual tasks. Furthermore, this review investigates the ben-
efits of using error rates and/or Task 1 performance as a data
source to improve our insight into dual-task processing and its
theory.
Methods
We searched papers via the abstracting and indexing database
PsycINFO devoted to peer-reviewed literature in the behav-
ioral sciences and mental health on May 17th 2013. The search
term was “PRP.” This search resulted in a total number of 291
entries from which we excluded reviews, clinical papers, disserta-
tion abstracts, book chapters, modeling studies, and non-English
entries. This exclusion procedure left a selection of 133 studies. In
total, these studies comprised 306 experiments.
2We were not interested in the reverse phenomenon of impaired performance
with increasing SOA (i.e., decreased RTs/error rates at short in contrast to
long SOAs) which is typically discussed in the context of grouping of two
responses/a tendency to withhold the execution of a first response until the
execution of a second response (Borger, 1963; Miller and Ulrich, 2008).
Results
In the Results section, we first focus on the amount of papers
presenting Task 1’s RT data vs. error rates in form of figures and/or
tables. Secondly, we report the amount of studies that perform
inference-statistical analyses (e.g., analysis of variance) on RTs
and/or error rates of this task. Thirdly, we review PRP studies with
a particular focus on the impact of decreasing SOA on decreasing
performance (i.e., increasing RTs and error rates) in Task 1.
The number and percent of experiments (out of the total of
306 experiments of 133 studies) presenting RT or error data in
form of (1) figures, (2) tables, (3) figures and tables, as well as
(4) figures and/or tables for Task 1, is presented in Table 1. Apart
from what PRP studies include and is presented in this table, the
reversed perspective on this table is remarkable: 181 (59.2%) of all
experiments [and 97 (45.3%) of all experiments with presentation
of Task 1 RT data] presented no error data. In contrast, only 92
(30.1%) of all experiments [and 8 (6.4%) of all experiments with
presentation of error data] presented noRTdata. Thus, this review
demonstrates the underrepresentation of error data presentation
in contrast to presenting RTs of Task 1 in PRP dual-task studies.
The number and percent of experiments (out of a total of 306
experiments of 133 studies) with statistical analyses of RT or error
data is presented in Table 2. From our perspective, the most
crucial fact of this table is that only 48.7% of the experiments pro-
vided statistical analyses of their RTs and error rates. On the other
side, this table shows that there is no complete presentation of
statistical analyses for 51.3% of the experiments. Thus, this review
demonstrates thatmanyPRPdual-task studies allowno conclusive
conclusions about Task 1 performance and no test of the implicit
assumption that this task’s performance is independent of SOA.
While focusing on the third issue, we exclusively analyzed the
selection of studies (combining 149 experiments, see Appendix)
that provided statistical analyses of their Task 1’s RTs and error
rates (Table 3). This focus shows that a remarkable number of PRP
dual-task studies produced data that are not consistent with the
assumption of a strict sequential bottleneck processing but calls
for additions to this bottleneck assumption (Figure 1B): Task 1
performance was not independent of SOA inmost of these studies
and showed impaired performance with decreasing SOA (67.1%).
TABLE 1 | Number and percent of experiments presenting RTs and error
rates in figures, tables, figures and tables, as well as figures or tables.
Figures Tables Figures
and tables
Figures
or tables
RTs 177 (57.8%) 72 (23.5%) 38 (12.4%) 214 (69.9%)
Error rates 19 (6.2%) 108 (35.3%) 2 (0.7%) 125 (40.8%)
Total number of experiments is 306.
TABLE 2 | Number and percent of experiments (total number experiments
is 306) with statistical analyses of (1) RTs, (2) error data, (3) RTs and error
data, as well as (4) RTs and/or error data in Task 1.
RTs Errors RTs and
errors
RTs and/
or errors
Task 1 statistics 227 (74.2%) 166 (54.2%) 149 (48.7%) 234 (76.5%)
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TABLE 3 | Number and percent of experiments (total number experiments
is 149) with statistical analyses of RTs and error data (see Table 2) as well
as an effect of SOA on Task 1 performance (i.e., decreasing SOA and
increasing RTs/error rates).
RTs Errors RTs and
errors
RTs and/
or errors
Task 1 SOA effect 55 (36.9%) 73 (49.0%) 28 (18.8%) 100 (67.1%)
Discussion
Our review demonstrates that a lot of studies do not present all
data that is required to analyze and model dual-task processing
in the context of the central bottleneck theory in the case of
PRP dual-task experiments. First, while a reasonable amount of
studies presented RT data of both component tasks (69.3%), this
amount is drastically reduced for error data: only 40.8% of the
PRP studies presented this data type in tables and/or figures. This
rather low amount of studies including error data presentations
demonstrates that there is no obtainable conclusive interpretation
of PRPdual-task performance inmany studies. Thus, these studies
do not allow to completely model dual-task processing in the
context of the central bottleneck theory. Furthermore, we found
a rather low number of studies that analyzed this data statistically
and allowed conclusive conclusions about in this context. At this
point, it is however fair to admit that not all studies that were
identified based on our literature search on “PRP” pursued on
investigating the central bottleneck theory; the PRP paradigm can
be used manifold (e.g., to simply induce capacity constraints to
Task 2 processing). In such cases, reports, analyses, and interpreta-
tions should mainly focus on relevant aspects (e.g., primarily data
of Task 2).
If we included studies with statistical reports on error data and
RTs, a substantial number of experiments demonstrated that, with
decreasing SOA, there are increases of error rates, increases of
RTs, or both in Task 1. In fact, 67.1% of the included experiments
demonstrated one of these patterns. We assume that this number
could be even higher because (1) experiments with SOA null
effects in Task 1 may merely lack statistical power to reach the
significance threshold of a SOA main effect and/or (2) studies
with no impaired performance with decreasing SOA also include
studies showing an opposite pattern: performance impairments
with increasing SOA (see text Footnote 2). This pattern may,
however, demonstrate the impact of a response grouping strategy
(e.g., Borger, 1963; Schubert, 1996; Miller and Ulrich, 2008). This
strategy may mask a data pattern of an impaired performance
with decreasing SOA and thus may obscure the number of studies
including this pattern. Moreover, for reasons of comparability, we
exclusively focused on SOA main effects and neglected combina-
tions of these effects with alternative experimental factors (i.e.,
interactions). The extension of the focus to interactions could
potentially increase the number of experiments with performance
impairments of Task 1with decreasing SOA (particularlywhen the
SOA main effect is non-significant).
Nevertheless, there are a number of theories that explicitly con-
sider dual-task costs in Task 1 (in the PRP context: performance
impairments at short in contrast to long SOAs). First, capacity-
sharing theories assume that two response selections can be pro-
cessed in parallel, but that sharing the same limited resource(s)
causes dual-task costs (e.g., Herman and Kantowitz, 1970; Kan-
towitz and Knight, 1974, 1976; Kantowitz, 1978; Wickens, 2002;
Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003), because there are fewer resources
for each individual task and performance is thus impaired. Par-
ticipants strategically prioritized one task over another follow-
ing instructions and/or changes in the relationship of difficulty
between the combined tasks, which is consistent with this per-
spective (e.g., Norman and Bobrow, 1975; Navon and Gopher,
1979; Gopher et al., 1982). Recent representatives of capacity-
sharing theories (e.g., Logan andGordon, 2001; Navon andMiller,
2002; Tombu and Jolicœur, 2003) assume that sequential pro-
cessing, as anticipated in the central bottleneck theory, may be a
strategic product of flexible scheduling of limited resources. For
example, participants may not have followed the instruction of
PRP dual tasks strictly scheduling engagement 100% to Task 1
and 0% to Task 2 adequately. Task 1 effects can also be explained
by the assumption of a strategic task scheduling with a flexible
bottleneck localization during the task processing and resource
sharing at the level of executive control processes (Meyer and
Kieras, 1997).
Second, dual-task costs in Task 1were also explained in terms of
between-task crosstalk (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Logan and Schulkind,
2000; Logan and Gordon, 2001; Lien and Proctor, 2002; Navon
andMiller, 2002; Schubert et al., 2008). For instance, performance
decreases when two tasks require the simultaneous execution
of incompatible (e.g., left vs. right) in contrast to compatible
(e.g., left vs. left) spatial responses. This crosstalk assumption is
generally consistent with the assumption of capacity-sharing the-
ories, since both enable information transfer between component
tasks under dual-task conditions. Thus, if some of the studies
demonstrating Task 1 performance impairment with decreasing
SOA showed this impairment because of crosstalk, this find-
ing is consistent with sharing common resources between tasks.
The difference between crosstalk approaches and capacity-sharing
theories is however that the former depend on what content
of information is processed while dual-task costs depend on
what sort of operation is to be carried out is interpreted in the
latter capacity-sharing context. Interestingly, the approaches of
Hommel (1998), Lien and Proctor (2002), as well as Schubert
et al. (2008) propose a distinction of different sub-processes of
the response selection mechanisms (e.g., response activation and
initiation), which to different degrees are subjected to cross-task
and to sequential processing between tasks. This allows explaining
a range of the reported Task 1 effects, with elaborated bottleneck
models.
Third, the processing bottleneck (in form of a shared capacity
limitation or a structural bottleneck as in the central bottleneck
theory) requires the coordination of two task processing streams.
For instance, these task coordination processes are related to
the efficient preparation of Task 1 information (de Jong, 1995),
scheduling of response selections, as well as switches between
them (Umiltà et al., 1992; Schubert, 1996, 2008; Lien et al., 2003;
Band and van Nes, 2006; Sigman and Dehaene, 2006; Szameitat
et al., 2006; Liepelt et al., 2011; Strobach et al., 2012b, 2014).
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We assume that the latter set of mechanisms (i.e., task coor-
dination processes) particularly affects Task 1 processing under
conditions of uncertainty of task order processing (e.g., Arnell and
Duncan, 2002, Experiment 1; de Jong, 1995; Tombu and Jolicœur,
2002; Luria and Meiran, 2003, 2005, 2006; Sigman and Dehaene,
2006; Schubert, 2008; Leonhard and Ulrich, 2011; Strobach et al.,
2012a; Töllner et al., 2012) because the decision on the order of
bottleneck access is typically located before bottleneck processing
in Task 1 (Umiltà et al., 1992; Schubert, 1996; Hendrich et al.,
2012). The number of studies with task order uncertainty is,
however, rather low in comparison to the entire set of analyzed
PRP studies and thus should not obscure our general conclusion: a
substantial number of experiments in the context of PRPdual-task
experiments demonstrate decreasing Task 1 performance with
decreasing SOA, which is not consistent with the assumption
that processes of Task 1 are unaffected of Task 2 and bottleneck
processing in the context of PRP dual-task situations. Actually,
this calls for a more careful consideration of theories proposing
additions to the bottleneck assumption, which are sufficiently
general to explain Task 1 and Task 2 effects.
Acknowledgment
We thank Antonia Papadakis for proofreading the text.
References
Allen, P. A., Smith, A. F., Vires-Collins, H., and Sperry, S. (1998). The psycholog-
ical refractory period: evidence for age differences in attentional time-sharing.
Psychol. Aging 13, 218–229.
Arnell, K. M., and Duncan, J. (2002). Separate and shared sources of dual-task cost
in stimulus identification and response selection. Cogn. Psychol. 44, 105–147.
doi: 10.1006/cogp.2001.0762
Band, G. P. H., and van Nes, F. T. (2006). Reconfiguration and the bottleneck:
does task switching affect the refractory-period effect? Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 18,
593–623. doi: 10.1080/09541440500423244
Boot, W. R., Blakely, D. P., and Simons, D. J. (2011). Do action video games improve
perception and cognition? Front. Psychol. 2:266. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00226
Borger, R. (1963). The refractory period and serial choice-reactions. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 15, 1–12. doi: 10.1080/17470216308416546
de Jong, R. (1995). Strategical determinants of compatibility effects with task
uncertainty. Acta Psychol. 88, 187–207. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(94)E0067-P
Gopher, D., Brickner, M., and Navon, D. (1982). Different difficulty manipulations
interact differently with task emphasis: evidence for multiple resources. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 8, 146–157. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.8.1.146
Greenwald, A. G. (2003). On doing two things at once: III. Confirmation
of perfect timesharing when simultaneous tasks are ideomotor compatible.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 859–868. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.29.5.859
Hendrich, E., Strobach, T., Buss, M., Müller, H., and Schubert, T. (2012). Temporal-
order judgment of visual and auditory stimuli: modulations in situations with
and without stimulus discrimination. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:63. doi: 10.3389/
fnint.2012.00063
Herman, L. M., and Kantowitz, B. H. (1970). The psychological refractory period
effect: only half the double-stimulation story? Psychol. Bull. 73, 74–88. doi:
10.1037/h0028357
Hommel, B. (1998). Automatic stimulus–response translation in dual-task perfor-
mance. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 24, 1368–1384. doi: 10.1037/
0096-1523.24.5.1368
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kantowitz, B.H. (1978). Response conflict theory, error rates and hybrid processing:
a reply to McLeod. Acta Psychol. 42, 397–403. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(78)
90021-5
Kantowitz, B. H., and Knight, J. L. (1974). Testing tapping time-sharing. J. Exp.
Psychol. 103, 331–336. doi: 10.1037/h0036808
Kantowitz, B. H., and Knight, J. L. Jr. (1976). Testing tapping timesharing, II:
auditory secondary task. Acta Psychol. 40, 343–362. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(76)
90016-0
Kunde, W., Landgraf, F., Paelecke, M., and Kiesel, A. (2007). Dorsal and ventral
processing under dual-task conditions. Psychol. Sci. 18, 100–104.
Leonhard, T., and Ulrich, R. (2011). Determinants of central processing order
in psychological refractory period paradigms: central arrival times, detection
times, or preparation?Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 64, 2012–2043. doi: 10.1080/17470218.
2011.573567
Lien, M.-C., and Proctor, R. W. (2002). Stimulus-response compatibility and psy-
chological refractory period effects: implications for response selection.Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 9, 212–238. doi: 10.3758/BF03196277
Lien, M.-C., Proctor, R. W., and Allen, P. A. (2002). Ideomotor compatibility
in the psychological refractory period effect: 29 years of oversimplification.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 28, 396–409. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.28.
2.396
Lien, M.-C., Schweickert, R., and Proctor, R. W. (2003). Task switching and
response correspondence in the psychological refractory period paradigm.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 692–712. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.29.
3.692
Liepelt, R., Strobach, T., Frensch, P., and Schubert, T. (2011). Improved intertask
coordination after extensive dual-task practice.Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 64, 1251–1272.
doi: 10.1080/17470218.2010.543284
Logan, G. D., and Gordon, R. D. (2001). Executive control of visual atten-
tion in dual-task situations. Psychol. Rev. 108, 393–434. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.108.2.393
Logan, G. D., and Schulkind, M. D. (2000). Parallel memory retrieval in dual-
task situations: I. Semantic memory. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26,
1072–1090. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.26.3.1072
Luria, R., and Meiran, N. (2003). Online order control in the psychological refrac-
tory period paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 556. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.29.3.556
Luria, R., and Meiran, N. (2005). Increased control demand results in serial pro-
cessing evidence from dual-task performance. Psychol. Sci. 16, 833–840. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01622.x
Luria, R., and Meiran, N. (2006). Dual route for subtask order control: evidence
from the psychological refractory paradigm.Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 59, 720–744. doi:
10.1080/02724980543000060
Meyer, D. E., andKieras, D. E. (1997). A computational theory of executive cognitive
processes and multiple-task performance: Part 2. Accounts of psychological
refractory-period phenomena. Psychol. Rev. 104, 749–791. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.104.4.749
Miller, J., and Ulrich, R. (2008). Bimanual response grouping in dual-task
paradigms. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 61, 999–1019. doi: 10.1080/17470210701434540
Navon, D., and Gopher, D. (1979). On the economy of the human-processing
system. Psychol. Rev. 86, 214–255. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.86.3.214
Navon, D., and Miller, J. (2002). Queuing or sharing? A critical evaluation of
the single-bottleneck notion. Cogn. Psychol. 44, 193–251. doi: 10.1006/cogp.
2001.0767
Norman, D. A., and Bobrow, D. G. (1975). On data-limited and resource-limited
processes. Cogn. Psychol. 7, 44–64. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(75)90004-3
Osman, A., and Moore, C. M. (1993). The locus of dual-task interference: psycho-
logical refractory effects on movement-related brain potentials. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percep. Perform. 19, 1292–1312.
Pashler, H. (1984). Processing stages in overlapping tasks: evidence for a central bot-
tleneck. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 10, 358–377. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.10.3.358
Pashler, H. (1994). Dual-task interference in simple tasks: data and theory. Psychol.
Bull. 116, 220–244. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.116.2.220
Pashler, H. (2000). “Task switching and multitask performance,” in Attention and
Performance, XVIII: Control of Mental Processes, eds S. Monsell, and J. Driver
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Pashler, H. and Johnston, J. (1989). Chronometric evidence for central postpone-
ment in temporally overlapping tasks. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 41A, 19–45.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 4035
Strobach et al. Review of PRP dual-task analyses
Pashler, H., and Johnston, J. C. (1998). “Attentional limitations in dual-task perfor-
mance,” in Attention, ed. H. Pashler (Psychology Press/Erlbaum (Uk) Taylor &
Francis: Hove), 155–189.
Ruthruff, E. and Pashler, H. E. (2001). “Perceptual and central interference in dual-
task performance,” in Temporal Constraints on Human Information Processing,
ed. K. Shapiro (New York: Oxford University Press), 100–123.
Schubert, T. (1996). Interference during the simultaneous performance of two tasks.
Z. Exp. Psychol. 4, 625–656.
Schubert, T. (1999). Processing differences between simple and choice reaction
affect bottleneck localization in overlapping tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 25, 408–425. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.25.2.408
Schubert, T. (2008). The central attentional limitation and executive control. Front.
Biosci. 13, 3569–3580. doi: 10.2741/2950
Schubert, T., Fischer, R., and Stelzel, C. (2008). Response activation in overlapping
tasks and the response selection bottleneck. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 34, 376–397. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.34.2.376
Shin, Y.-K., Cho, Y.-S., Lien, M.-C., and Proctor, R. W. (2007). Is the psycho-
logical refractory period effect for ideomotor compatible tasks eliminated by
speed-emphasis instructions? Psychol. Res. 71, 553–567. doi: 10.1007/s00426-
006-0066-2
Sigman, M., and Dehaene, S. (2006). Dynamics of the central bottleneck: dual-task
and task uncertainty. PLoS Biol. 4:e220. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220
Strobach, T., Frensch, P. A., and Schubert, T. (2012a). Video game practice opti-
mizes executive control skills in dual-task and task switching situations. Acta
Psychol. 140, 13–24. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.02.001
Strobach, T., Frensch, P. A., Soutschek, A., and Schubert, T. (2012b). Investigation
on the improvement and transfer of dual-task coordination skills. Psychol. Res.
76, 794–811. doi: 10.1007/s00426-011-0381-0
Strobach, T., Liepelt, R., Pashler, H., Frensch, P. A., and Schubert, T. (2013). Effects
of extensive dual-task practice on processing stages in simultaneous choice tasks.
Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 75, 900–920. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0451-z
Strobach, T., Salminen, T., Karbach, J., and Schubert, T. (2014). Practice-related
optimization and transfer of executive functions: a general review and a specific
realization of their mechanisms in dual tasks. Psychol. Res. 78, 836–851. doi:
10.1007/s00426-014-0563-7
Szameitat, A. J., Lepsien, J., Von Cramon, D. Y., Sterr, A., and Schubert, T. (2006).
Task-order coordination in dual-task performance and the lateral prefrontal cor-
tex: an event-related fMRI study. Psychol. Res. 70, 541–552. doi: 10.1007/s00426-
005-0015-5
Telford, C. W. (1931). The refractory phase of voluntary and associative responses.
J. Exp. Psychol. 14, 1–36.
Töllner, T., Strobach, T., Schubert, T., and Müller, H. J. (2012). The effect of
task order predictability in audio-visual dual task performance: just a cen-
tral capacity limitation? Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:75. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.
00075
Tombu, M., and Jolicœur, P. (2002). All-or-none bottleneck versus capacity sharing
accounts of the psychological refractory period phenomenon. Psychol. Res. 66,
274–286. doi: 10.1007/s00426-002-0101-x
Tombu, M., and Jolicœur, P. (2003). A central capacity sharing model of dual-task
performance. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 3–18. doi: 10.1037/
0096-1523.29.1.3
Umiltà, C., Nicoletti, R., Simion, F., Tagliabue, M. E., and Bagnara, S. (1992).
The cost of a strategy. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 4, 21–40. doi: 10.1080/
09541449208406241
Vince,M. (1949). Rapid response sequences and the psychological refractory period.
Br. J. of Psychol. 40, 23–40.
Welford, A. T. (1952). The psychological refractory period and the timing of
high speed performance—a review and a theory. Br. J. Psychol. 43, 2–19. doi:
10.1111/j.2044-8295.1952.tb00322.x
Wickens, C. D. (1980). “The structure of attentional resources,” inAttention and Per-
formance VIII, ed. R. Nickerson (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
Wickens, C. D. (2002).Multiple resources and performance prediction.Theor. Issues
Ergon. Sci. 3, 159–177. doi: 10.1080/14639220210123806
Zwosta, K., Hommel, B., Goschke, T., and Fischer, R. (2013). Mood states deter-
mine the degree of task shielding in dual-task performance. Cogn. Emot. 27,
1142–1152. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.772047
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Strobach, Schütz and Schubert. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 4036
Strobach et al. Review of PRP dual-task analyses
Appendix
Allen, P. A., Lien, M., Murphy, M. D., Sanders, R. E., Judge, K. S., and McCann,
R. S. (2002). Age differences in overlapping-task performance: evidence for
efficient parallel processing in older adults. Psychol. Aging 17, 505–519. doi:
10.1037/0882-7974.17.3.505
Allen, P. A., Ruthruff, E., Elicker, J. D., and Lien, M. (2009). Multisession, dual-
task psychological refractory period practice benefits older and younger adults
equally. Exp. Aging Res. 35, 369–399. doi: 10.1080/03610730903175766
Allen, P. A., Smith, A. F., Vires-Collins, H., and Sperry, S. (1998). The psycholog-
ical refractory period: evidence for age differences in attentional time-sharing.
Psychol. Aging 13, 218–229. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.13.2.218
Arnell, K. M., and Duncan, J. (2002). Separate and shared sources of dual-task cost
in stimulus identification and response selection. Cogn. Psychol. 44, 105–147.
doi: 10.1006/cogp.2001.0762
Arnell, K. M., Helion, A.M., Hurdelbrink, J. A., and Pasieka, B. (2004). Dissociating
sources of dual-task interference using human electrophysiology. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 11, 77–83. doi: 10.3758/BF03206464
Band, G. P. H., and van Nes, F. T. (2006). Reconfiguration and the bottleneck:
does task switching affect the refractory period effect? Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 18,
593–623. doi: 10.1080/09541440500423244
Bausenhart, K. M., Rolke, B., Hackley, S. A., and Ulrich, R. (2006). The locus of
temporal preparation effects: evidence from the psychological refractory period
paradigm. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 13, 536–542. doi: 10.3758/BF03193882
Besner, D., Mike, R., and O’Malley, S. (2009). When underadditivity of fac-
tor effects in the psychological refractory period paradigm implies a bottle-
neck: evidence from psycholinguistics. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 62, 2222–2234. doi:
10.1080/17470210902747187
Brisson, B., and Jolicoeur, P. (2007a). A psychological refractory period in access to
visual short-termmemory and the deployment of visual-spatial attention:multi-
tasking processing deficits revealed by event-related potentials. Psychophysiology
44, 323–333. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00503.x
Brisson, B., and Jolicoeur, P. (2007b). Electrophysiological evidence of central
interference in the control of visuospatial attention. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14,
126–132. doi: 10.3758/BF03194039
Brisson, B., Leblanc, E., and Jolicoeur, P. (2009). Contingent capture of visual-
spatial attention depends on capacity-limited central mechanisms: evidence
from human electrophysiology and the psychological refractory period. Biol.
Psychol. 80, 218–225. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2008.10.001
Carrier, L. M., and Pashler, H. (1995). Attentional limits in memory retrieval. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 21, 1339–1348. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.21.5.1339
Cleland, A. A., Gaskell, M. G., Quinlan, P. T., and Tamminen, J. (2006). Fre-
quency effects in spoken and visual word recognition: evidence from dual-
task methodologies. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 32, 104–119. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.32.1.104
Corriveau, I., Fortier-Gauthier, U., Pomerleau, V. J., McDonald, J., Dell’Acqua, R.,
and Jolicoeur, P. (2012). Electrophysiological evidence of multitasking impair-
ment of attentional deployment reflects target-specific processing, not distractor
inhibition. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 86, 152–159. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.06.005
Crebolder, J. M., Jolicoeur, P., andMcIlwaine, J. D. (2002). Loci of signal probability
effects and of the attentional blink bottleneck. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 28, 695–716. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.28.3.695
Dell’Acqua, R., Turatto, M., and Jolicoeur, P. (2001). Cross-modal attentional
deficits in processing tactile stimulation. Percept. Psychophys. 63, 777–789. doi:
10.3758/BF03194437
Dent, K., Johnston, R. A., and Humphreys, G. W. (2008). Age of acquisition and
word frequency effects in picture naming: a dual-task investigation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 34, 282–301. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.2.282
Fan, Z., Singh, K., Muthukumaraswamy, S., Sigman, M., Dehaene, S., and Shapiro,
K. (2012). The cost of serially chaining two cognitive operations. Psychol. Res.
76, 566–578. doi: 10.1007/s00426-011-0375-y
Fernández, S. R., Leonhard, T., Rolke, B., and Rolf, U. (2011). Processing two tasks
with varying task order: central stage duration influences central processing
order. Acta Psychol. 137, 10–17. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.01.016
Fischer, R., Miller, J., and Schubert, T. (2007). Evidence for parallel semantic mem-
ory retrieval in dual tasks.Mem. Cogn. 35, 1685–1699. doi: 10.3758/BF03193502
Fischer, R., and Schubert, T. (2008). Valence processing bypassing the response
selection bottleneck? Evidence from the psychological refractory period
paradigm. Exp. Psychol. 55, 203–211. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.55.3.203
Gaskell, M. G., Quinlan, P. T., Tamminen, J., and Cleland, A. A. (2008). The nature
of phoneme representation in spoken word recognition. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen.
137, 282–302. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.137.2.282
Glass, J. M., Schumacher, E. H., Lauber, E. J., Zubriggen, E. L., Gmeindl, L.,
Kieras, D. E., et al. (2000). Aging and the psychological refractory period: task-
coordination strategies in young and old adults. Psychol. Aging 15, 571–595. doi:
10.1037/0882-7974.15.4.571
Green, C., Johnston, J. C., and Ruthruff, E. (2011). Attentional limits in memory
retrieval—revisited. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 37, 1083–1098. doi:
10.1037/a0023095
Hartley, A. A., Maquestiaux, F., Brooks, R. D., Festini, S. B., and Frazier, K. (2012).
Electrodermal responses to sources of dual-task interference. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 12, 543–556. doi: 10.3758/s13415-012-0094-x
Hazeltine, E., and Ruthruff, E. (2006). Modality pairing effects and the response
selection bottleneck. Psychol. Res. 70, 504–513. doi: 10.1007/s00426-005-
0017-3
Heil, M., Wahl, K., and Herbst, M. (1999). Mental rotation, memory scanning, and
the central bottleneck. Psychol. Res. 62, 48–61. doi: 10.1007/s004260050039
Hein, G., and Schubert, T. (2004). Aging and input processing in dual-task situa-
tions. Psychol. Aging 19, 416–432. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.19.3.416
Hesselmann, G., Flandin, G., and Dehaene, S. (2011). Probing the cortical network
underlying the psychological refractory period: a combined EEG–fMRI study.
Neuroimage 56, 1608–1621. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.017
Hibberd, D. L., Jamson, S., and Carsten, O. M. J. (2013). Mitigating the effects
of in-vehicle distractions through use of the Psychological Refractory Period
paradigm. Accid. Anal. Prev. 50, 1096–1103. doi: 10.1016/j.aap.2012.08.016
Janczyk, M., Franz, V. H., and Kunde, W. (2010). Grasping for parsimony: do some
motor actions escape dorsal processing? Neuropsychologia 48, 3405–3415. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.034
Janczyk,M., andKunde,W. (2010). Does dorsal processing require central capacity?
More evidence from the PRP paradigm. Exp. Brain Res. 203, 89–100. doi:
10.1007/s00221-010-2211-9
Jentzsch, I., Leuthold, H., and Ulrich, R. (2007). Decomposing sources of response
slowing in the PRP paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 33,
610–626. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.3.610
Jiang, Y., Saxe, R., and Kanwisher, N. (2004). Functional magnetic resonance
imaging provides new constraints on theories of the psychological refractory
period. Psychol. Sci. 15, 390–396. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00690.x
Jolicoeur, P., and Dell’Acqua, R. (1999). Attentional and structural constraints on
visual encoding. Psychol. Res. 62, 154–164. doi: 10.1007/s004260050048
Klapötke, S., Krüger, D., andMattler, U. (2011). A PRP-study to determine the locus
of target priming effects. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 882–900. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2011.04.008
Krüger, D., Klapötke, S., and Mattler, U. (2011). PRP-paradigm provides evidence
for a perceptual origin of the negative compatibility effect. Conscious. Cogn. 20,
866–881. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.014
Kunde, W., Landgraf, F., Paelecke, M., and Kiesel, A. (2007). Dorsal and ventral
processing under dual-task conditions. Psychol. Sci. 18, 100–104. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-9280.2007.01855.x
Kunde, W., Pfister, R., and Janczyk, M. (2012). The locus of tool-transformation
costs. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 38, 703–714. doi: 10.1037/
a0026315
Lawson, R., Humphreys, G. W., and Jolicoeur, P. (2000). The combined effects of
plane disorientation and foreshortening on picture naming: one manipulation
or two? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26, 568–581. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.26.2.568
Leonhard, T., Fernández, S. R., Ulrich, R., andMiller, J. (2011). Dual-task processing
when task 1 is hard and task 2 is easy: reversed central processing order? J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 37, 115–136. doi: 10.1037/a0019238
Levy, J., Pashler, H., and Boer, E. (2006). Central interference in driving: is there
any stopping the psychological refractory period? Psychol. Sci. 17, 228–235. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01690.x
Lien, M., Croswaite, K., and Ruthruff, E. (2011). Controlling spatial attention
without central attentional resources: evidence from event-related potentials.
Vis. Cogn. 19, 37–78. doi: 10.1080/13506285.2010.491643
Lien, M., McCann, R. S., Ruthruff, E., and Proctor, R. W. (2005). Dual-task per-
formance with ideomotor-compatible tasks: is the central processing bottleneck
intact, bypassed, or shifted in locus? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 31,
122–144. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.122
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 4037
Strobach et al. Review of PRP dual-task analyses
Lien, M., Proctor, R. W., and Allen, P. A. (2002). Ideomotor compatibility in the
psychological refractory period effect: 29 years of oversimplification. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 28, 396–409. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.28.2.396
Lien, M., Schweickert, R., and Proctor, R. W. (2003). Task switching and response
correspondence in the psychological refractory period paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 692–712. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.29.3.692
Luria, R., and Meiran, N. (2003). Online order control in the psychological refrac-
tory period paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 556–574. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.29.3.556
Luria, R., and Meiran, N. (2006). Dual route for subtask order control: evidence
from the psychological refractory paradigm.Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 59, 720–744. doi:
10.1080/02724980543000060
Magen, H., and Cohen, A. (2005). Location specificity in response selection
processes for visual stimuli. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12, 541–548. doi: 10.3758/
BF03193802
Magen,H., andCohen,A. (2010).Modularity beyond perception: evidence from the
PRP paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 395–414. doi: 10.1037/
a0017174
Maquestiaux, F., Lague-Beauvais, M., Ruthruff, E., and Bherer, L. (2008). Bypassing
the central bottleneck after single-task practice in the psychological refrac-
tory period paradigm: evidence for task automatization and greedy resource
recruitment.Mem. Cogn. 36, 1262–1282. doi: 10.3758/MC.36.7.1262
Maquestiaux, F., Lague-Beauvais, M., Ruthruff, E., Hartley, A., and Bherer, L.
(2010). Learning to bypass the central bottleneck: declining automaticity with
advancing age. Psychol. Aging 25, 177–192. doi: 10.1037/a0017122
Miller, J. (2006). Backward crosstalk effects in psychological refractory period
paradigms: effects of second-task response types on first-task response latencies.
Psychol. Res. 70, 484–493. doi: 10.1007/s00426-005-0011-9
Miller, J., and Alderton, M. (2006). Backward response-level crosstalk in the psy-
chological refractory period paradigm. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
32, 149–165. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.32.1.149
Miller, J., and Reynolds, A. (2003). The locus of redundant-targets and nontargets
effects: evidence from the psychological refractory period paradigm. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 1126–1142. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.29.6.1126
Miller, J., Ulrich, R., and Rolke, B. (2009). On the optimality of serial and paral-
lel processing in the psychological refractory period paradigm: effects of the
distribution of stimulus onset asynchronies. Cogn. Psychol. 58, 273–310. doi:
10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.08.003
Müller, D., and Schwarz, W. (2007). Exploring the mental number line: evidence
from a dual-task paradigm. Psychol. Res. 71, 598–613. doi: 10.1007/s00426-006-
0070-6
O’Malley, S., Reynolds, M. G., Stolz, J. A., and Besner, D. (2008). Reading aloud:
spelling-sound translation uses central attention. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem.
Cogn. 34, 422–429. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.2.422
Oriet, C., and Jolicoeur, P. (2003). Absence of perceptual processing during recon-
figuration of task set. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 1036–1049. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.29.5.1036
Oriet, C., and Jolicoeur, P. (2008). Differential central resource demands of memory
scanning and visual search: the role of consistent and variedmapping.Vis. Cogn.
16, 514–551. doi: 10.1080/13506280701252108
Osman, A., and Moore, C. M. (1993). The locus of dual-task interference: psycho-
logical refractory effects on movement-related brain potentials. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 19, 1292–1312. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.19.6.1292
Paelecke, M., and Kunde, W. (2007). Action-effect codes in and before the central
bottleneck: evidence from the psychological refractory period paradigm. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 33, 627–644. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.3.627
Pannebakker, M. M., Band, G. P. H., and Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2009). Operation
compatibility: a neglected contribution to dual-task costs. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 35, 447–460. doi: 10.1037/a0013029
Pashler, H., Harris, C. R., and Nuechterlein, K. H. (2008). Does the central bottle-
neck encompass voluntary selection of hedonically based choices? Exp. Psychol.
55, 313–321. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.55.5.313
Pollock, J. W., Khoja, N., Kaut, K. P., Lien, M., and Allen, P. A. (2012). Electro-
physiological evidence for adult age-related sparing and decrements in emo-
tion perception and attention. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:60. doi: 10.3389/fnint.
2012.00060
Ricciardelli, P., and Turatto, M. (2011). Is attention necessary for perceiving gaze
direction? It depends on how you look at it: evidence from the locus-of-slack
method. Vis. Cogn. 19, 154–170. doi: 10.1080/13506285.2010.514140
Richards, E., Tombu, M., Stolz, J. A., and Jolicoeur, P. (2004). Features of percep-
tion: exploring the perception of change in a psychological refractory period
paradigm. Vis. Cogn. 11, 751–780. doi: 10.1080/13506280344000509
Ruthruff, E., Hazeltine, E., and Remington, R.W. (2006).What causes residual dual-
task interference after practice? Psychol. Res. 70, 494–503. doi: 10.1007/s00426-
005-0012-8
Ruthruff, E., Johnston, J. C., and Van Selst, M. (2001). Why practice reduces
dual-task interference. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 27, 3–21. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.27.1.3
Ruthruff, E., Miller, J., and Lachmann, T. (1995). Does mental rotation require
central mechanisms? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 21, 552–570. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.21.3.552
Ruthruff, E., Pashler, H. E., and Hazeltine, E. (2003). Dual-task interference with
equal task emphasis: graded capacity sharing or central postponement? Percept.
Psychophys. 65, 801–816. doi: 10.3758/BF03194816
Schnur, T. T., and Martin, R. (2012). Semantic picture–word interference is a
postperceptual effect. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 19, 301–308. doi: 10.3758/s13423-011-
0190-x
Schubert, T., Fischer, R., and Stelzel, C. (2008). Response activation in overlapping
tasks and the response-selection bottleneck. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 34, 376–397. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.34.2.376
Schuch, S., and Koch, I. (2004). The costs of changing the representation of
action: response repetition and response-response compatibility in dual tasks.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 30, 566–582. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.30.
3.566
Schumacher, E. H., Lauber, E. J., Glass, J. M., Zubriggen, E. L., Gmeindl, L.,
Kieras, D. E., et al. (1999). Concurrent response-selection processes in dual-task
performance: evidence for adaptive executive control of task scheduling. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 25, 791–814. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.25.3.791
Schumacher, E. H., and Schwarb, H. (2009). Parallel response selection dis-
rupts sequence learning under dual-task conditions. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 138,
270–290. doi: 10.1037/a0015378
Shin, Y., Kyoung, C., Yang Seok Lien, M., and Proctor, R. W. (2007). Is the
psychological refractory period effect for ideomotor compatible tasks eliminated
by speed-stress instructions?Psychol. Res. 71, 553–567. doi: 10.1007/s00426-006-
0066-2
Shin, Y., and Proctor, R. W. (2008). Are spatial responses to visuospatial stimuli and
spoken responses to auditory letters ideomotor-compatible tasks? Examination
of set-size effects on dual-task interference. Acta Psychol. 129, 352–364. doi:
10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.09.001
Stelzel, C., and Schubert, T. (2011). Interference effects of stimulus–response
modality pairings in dual tasks and their robustness. Psychol. Res. 75, 476–490.
doi: 10.1007/s00426-011-0368-x
Töllner, T., Strobach, T., Schubert, T., and Müller, H. J. (2012). The effect of task
order predictability in audio-visual dual task performance: just a central capacity
limitation? Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:75. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00075
Tombu, M., and Jolicoeur, P. (2002a). All-or-none bottleneck versus capacity shar-
ing accounts of the psychological refractory period phenomenon. Psychol. Res.
66, 274–286. doi: 10.1007/s00426-002-0101-x
Tombu, M., and Jolicoeur, P. (2002b). Does size rescaling require central attention?
Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 56, 10–17. doi: 10.1037/h0087381
Tombu, M., and Jolicoeur, P. (2005). Testing the predictions of the central capac-
ity sharing model. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 31, 790–802. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.31.4.790
Ulrich, R., Fernández, S. R., Jentzsch, I., Rolke, B., Schröter, H., and Leuthold,
H. (2006). Motor limitation in dual-task processing under ballistic movement
conditions. Psychol. Sci. 17, 788–793. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01783.x
Vachon, F., and Jolicoeur, P. (2012). On the automaticity of semantic pro-
cessing during task switching. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 24, 611–626. doi: 10.1162/
jocn_a_00149
Vu, K. L., and Proctor, R. W. (2006). Emergent perceptual features in the benefit of
consistent stimulus-response mappings on dual-task performance. Psychol. Res.
70, 468–483. doi: 10.1007/s00426-005-0021-7
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 4038
